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The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.

　　自5月8日的海南万宁发生“小学校长带学生开房”事件开始，到5月28日广东深圳、湖南郴州和安徽六安三地分别曝出教师涉嫌猥亵小学女生的案件，20天内媒体已报道8起校园内猥亵性侵幼女案，令国人震怒，刺痛了人们的眼球和神经，更引发了当今社会如何强化对未成年人保护的反思。

　　据北京青少年法律援助与研究中心主任佟丽华向媒体透露，该中心曾对2006年至2008年媒体报道的340件性侵未成年人案件进行统计分析，时至今日却发现，相似案件仍在重复发生。该中心的统计分析显示，性侵未成年人案件主要特点有四：一是大多数系熟人作案。在340件案件中熟人作案占68%；二是校园内发生的性侵案值得重视，在340件案件中有50件属此类；三是国家公职人员性侵危害严重。比如2007年至2008年发生的贵州习水县多名公职人员嫖宿幼女案，涉及强奸、强迫卖淫的有政府官员、司法干部、教师等公职人员；四是不满14周岁的被性侵幼女为大多数，占总数的63.8%，年龄最小的只有1岁（参见《法制日报》记者张媛在该报2013年6月1日“人大立法”版上的采访报道）。这表明，在我国性侵未成年人犯罪早已有过发生，并非今天才有，只是没有引起人们的充分警觉、未发展到今天的严重程度罢了。应当认为，现在是应当引起严重关注、并应当采取最为严厉的惩防措施的时候了。

　　根据近些年我国发生性侵未成年人犯罪的情况分析，尤其是北京青少年法律援助与研究中心对性侵未成年人犯罪案件的统计分析中关于该类犯罪特点的归纳揭露，全国上下应当引起高度重视，切实采取紧急措施。强化防范力度，坚持惩防并举，全力遏制此类犯罪现象的蔓延趋势。在笔者看来，以下两个方面的惩防措施应当尽快推进：

　　一、废除嫖宿幼女罪，单设奸淫幼女罪

　　针对性侵未成年人犯罪的侵害对象大多是未满14周岁的幼女这一特殊现象，必须首先从立法上进行反思和研究，方能从根本上寻找遏制途径。笔者十分赞同北京青少年法律援助与研究中心主任佟丽华的观点，应当尽快废止嫖宿幼女罪，单设奸淫幼女罪。这是因为，嫖宿幼女罪原本就缺乏保护未成年女性的功能，事实证明该罪的设置反生消极作用。一是，嫖宿幼女罪作为嫖宿不满14周岁幼女的犯罪行为，是从全国人大常委会《关于严禁卖淫漂娼的决定》第5条第2款的规定吸收改为刑法规定的，且将此罪置入社会管理范畴，这种刑法上的安排本身就是欠妥的。未成年人是国家的重点保护对象，而幼女又是未成年人中更加重点保护的对象，怎么可以将此种性侵犯罪纳入社会管理而不纳入公民人身权利保护范畴呢？二是，嫖宿幼女罪本身就有一种理解上的消极误导作用——用金钱开道什么事都可以干，甚至连幼女都可以睡，于是就有了“买处”、“破处”的不法分子将罪恶之手伸向了最弱势群体的幼女。甚至发生了小学校长肆无忌惮的带数名小学女生开房事件。三是，嫖宿幼女罪弱化了整个社会对幼女性侵害后果的认识，助长了此类犯罪现象的蔓延，从贵州的习水事件到海南万宁的小学校长开房事件，不得不认为这是设置嫖宿幼女罪带出的严重社会后果。

　　奸淫幼女罪，原属于我国“79刑法”第一百三十九条和“97刑法”第二百六十六条的规定，条文规定均表述为：“奸淫不满十四周岁的幼女的，以强奸论，从重处罚”。刑法理论界对该种犯罪的通说认为，由于幼女的身心发育尚未成熟，缺乏辨别和反抗的能力，因此，一般说来，不论行为人采取什么手段，也不论被害人是否同意或是否抗拒，只要与幼女发生了性行为，就构成犯罪。而且，考虑到幼女的生理特点，只要行为人的生殖器与幼女的生殖器官接触，即视为强奸既遂，这体现了国家对幼女的特殊保护，（周道莺、张军主编《刑法罪名精释》[第三版]）。笔者之所以主张废除嫖宿幼女罪而单设奸淫幼女罪取而代之，并直接纳入公民人身权利保护范畴，理由如下：首先，奸淫幼女罪与强奸罪在犯罪构成上具有很大的区别，因而奸淫幼女罪不能归入强奸罪，应当独立成罪。一方面，强奸罪侵害的主体是十四周岁以上接近成年的妇女和成年妇女，而奸淫幼女罪侵害的主体是十四周岁以下的幼女。另方面，成年妇女具有辨别能力和反抗能力，但幼女不具有这些能力，将其纳入强奸罪处理既有违区别对待的刑事政策，又不利于对幼女的特别保护。再方面，既然幼女与成年妇女之间缺乏可比性，则当然不宜以同一罪名处罚犯罪行为人，也不利于对以“买处”、“破处”等嫖宿之名奸淫幼女等犯罪行为施以从重打击，更不利于对幼女实行特别保护的政策。其次，嫖宿幼女罪与奸淫幼女罪有很多相似之处，后者具有取代前者的成熟条件。一方面，奸淫幼女罪体现为对公民人身权利之保护，而嫖宿幼女罪的本质特征是与幼女发生性行为，当然构成对幼女人生权利的侵犯，二者具有替代性。另方面，奸淫幼女罪不因被害幼女接受财物的影响，也不因幼女是否同意发生性行为的影响，而嫖宿幼女罪的客观表现完全体现了奸淫幼女罪的表现方式。正如佟丽华所言：“金钱交易并不影响对行为性质的认定”，因此，后者对前者完全具有吸收性和容纳性。再方面，将嫖宿幼女罪归入奸淫幼女罪，不但完全符合奸淫幼女罪的构成要件，而且免除了一些不必要的情节纠缠。比如，凡明知被害人系某校的小学女生，完全可以认定为“明知”其为幼女，因为按现今的小学六年制，小学阶段的女生除极个别外不可能是十四周岁以上的学生。又比如，凡教师与小学女生发生性关系，完全可以推定行为人“明知”是幼女，因为行为人本身存在较多“明知”的条件和经验。从而有利于惩罚犯罪分子，有效保护幼女的身心健康。

　　二、始终保持对性侵未成年人犯罪从严打击的高压态势

　　据媒体报道，5月8日海南省万宁市后郎小学6名就读小学6年级的女生集体失踪。经警方侦查，万宁市第二小学校长陈在鹏和房管局职员冯小松分别带4名女生和2名女生到酒店开房。经医院检查，6名女生下体受到不同程度伤害。该案经媒体报露后，引起社会高度关注。5月10日，警方对陈、冯二人刑事拘留。5月24日，万宁市公安局侦查终结，以猥亵儿童罪将该案移送检察机关审查起诉。5月28日，万宁市检察院以陈、冯二人涉嫌犯强奸罪向万宁市人民法院提起公诉，该院已于当日立案受理（参见2013年6月10日《法制日报》“视点栏目”的新闻追踪）。司法机关的举动令人欣慰。据最新报道，6月20日，海南省第一中级人民法院经不公开审理并当庭宣判。陈在鹏被一审判处有期徒刑13年6个月，冯小松被判处有期徒刑11年6个月，均受到国法的严惩。

　　陈在鹏、冯小松制造的“万宁性侵幼女事件”，从司法机关目前的走势看，检察机关提起公诉和法院立案受理均定性为强奸犯罪，结果法院经过审理最终以强奸罪追究责任，表明公安机关认定的猥亵儿童罪被否定，而且更是对《刑法》第三百六十条第二款的嫖宿幼女罪之否定。客观现实已经表明，嫖宿幼女罪已无存在之必要，因为该种犯罪针对的是既无辨别能力又无反抗能力的幼女，即使表面现象的金钱交易，同样无法改变与幼女发生性行为的犯罪性质。如果要强调始终保持对性侵未成年人犯罪从严打击的高压态势，立法废除嫖宿幼女罪为首要条件，否则将无力遏制性侵幼女犯罪的蔓延。

　　保持从重打击的高压态势，源自于1983年开始的全国性“严打”斗争的号召，其法律根据是全国人大常委会《关于严惩严重危害社会治安的犯罪分子的决定》。当时的要求，对于“严重危害社会治安的犯罪分子，可以在刑法规定的最高刑以上处刑，直至判处死刑”。对这些人，司法机关突出七类严重刑事犯罪（七类即指杀人、抢劫、强奸、爆炸、投毒等七种重大刑事犯罪）予以重点打击，奸淫幼女罪作为强奸类型列入其中。时至今时，地方各省市的“五长会议”在研究部署重大专项打击活动时，仍要求“保持从重打击的高压态势”。根据目前全国各地连续发生的性侵未成年人犯罪，尤其是性侵幼女犯罪，从中央到地方完全可以重点部署、适时开展严惩性侵未成年人犯罪活动之专项斗争，这不但很有必要，而且可以由此形成威慑机制，并深入各行各业，必将有效遏制性侵未成年人犯罪的蔓延。

　　在具体案件的处理上，通过司法解释统一从重处罚的量刑标准，减少盲目性，严把案件质量。《刑法》第六十一条规定：“对于犯罪分子决定刑罚的时候，应当根据犯罪的事实、犯罪的性质、情节和对于社会的危害程度，依照本法有关规定判处”。这就是司法机关量刑应掌握的标准。这里所讲的“犯罪事实”，是指犯罪构成要件的全部事实，包括犯罪主体、犯罪的主观要件，犯罪客体，犯罪的客观要件。“犯罪的性质”，即指什么性质的犯罪，确定怎么样的罪名，这其中准确确定罪名很重要，必须严格掌握。“犯罪情节”是指实施犯罪的具体情况，包括法定情节（即刑法规定的从重、从轻、减轻或免除处罚的情节），也包括酌定情节，如犯罪动机、犯罪时机、环境和条件、犯罪人的一贯表现、认罪态度等（参见郎胜主编《中华人民共和国刑法释义》，法律出版社2011年4月第5版，第67页）。这其中，尤其要注重对性侵犯罪的“从重处罚”的研究，因为这直接涉及对该类犯罪能否“从重打击”的效果。在笔者看来，从犯罪主体看，党员、干部、公职人员犯罪的从重；教师奸淫未成年学生尤其是奸淫幼女的从重；利用抚养关系、亲戚关系、代管关系作案的从重。从犯罪手段上，暴力和暴力威逼、打骂施行犯罪的从重；先奸后卖、奸后强迫卖淫的从重，并应实行数罪并罚；多次作案，恶习较深、态度顽固的从重。对此类中极端恶劣者，笔者同意佟丽华的观点，可以立法引入类似化学阉割的域外制度，彻底摧毁作案人的犯罪意志。

　　除此之外，重教育、抓管控，形成全社会齐抓共管性侵未成年人犯罪的防范工作十分重要。性犯罪属丑恶型犯罪，直接挑战社会道德和国家法律的底线。防范和惩治此类犯罪，应当德法兼施、惩防并举，动员和调动家庭、学校、教育、治安、纪监等职能部门的参与积极性，并加大硬件建设的投入，广施电子跟踪和视频监控，发动自愿者介入，组织夜间巡逻，加强重点场所的管控，消灭死角地带。如此，必将有助于遏制性侵未成年人犯罪之蔓延。

　　（作者单位：重庆市奉节县人民法院）